The Word “Knowledge”

We went through thirteen chapters but never defined knowledge. We spoke of measurements, sources, rules, proofs — of why we count our answers right. Now, before returning to your prologue phrase, pin down what ties these conversations together.

Confidence and its grounds

“I know the house was built in 1968” can be said in full confidence. But the person across the table may ask: where did that date come from?

If the answer is “I remember well”, we can pin down what exactly the person remembers. If he shows a registration certificate, we can read the entry and find out which year it states: of construction, of commissioning, or of something else. The conversation continues thanks to information that helps check the claim.

Confidence and groundedness are different things. One may never doubt and be wrong. One may speak cautiously of a conclusion with serious grounds behind it. Tone of voice alone decides nothing about who is right.

In a conversation about knowledge two questions help tell apart: how sure a person is, and what his conviction stands on. In this book we cared above all about the second.

Three conditions and one difficulty

One known philosophical approach describes knowledge as justified true belief. A person accepts some claim; the claim is true; the person holds sufficient grounds to accept it. These conditions help tell belief, truth and justification apart.

Already in Plato’s Theaetetus a close thought is discussed: true opinion must come with an account. In the dialogue, though, that answer meets criticism. Ascribing to Plato a ready definition, simply handed down through the ages after, would be inexact.

There is another difficulty, pointed out in 1963 by the philosopher Edmund Gettier. Picture two job applicants — Smith and Jones. The manager assured Smith that Jones would be picked. Smith also counted the coins in Jones’s pocket: ten of them. He concludes that the man who gets the job holds ten coins in his pocket.

But the job goes to Smith himself. And he, unbeknownst to himself, holds ten coins too. His conclusion proved true, though it rested on information about another person.

Smith held grounds for his belief, and it turned out right by coincidence. This example shows the difficulty: no lucky outcome replaces the belief’s tie to truth. Exactly this reasoning targets the three conditions’ sufficiency.

For this book’s tasks the whole dispute over knowledge’s definition needs no settling. But it cannot be bypassed by simply renaming any explained claim as knowledge.

Checking and its limits

We never dropped the question “is it right?”. For its sake we checked measurements, read sources, computed and planned experiments. Factoring 341 established the number is composite. New information on the genetic code showed the old generalisation’s boundary.

The catch is that not every justification guarantees. A well-backed supposition may prove too wide. Observations in studied systems do not yet establish that UGA in every possible case means synthesis halt.

A date helps understand which grounds were available to a researcher. It does not make a mistaken claim true for its time. But the prospect of a future review does not mean nothing can be found out now either.

So we need both questions: what lets a claim be counted right, and how reliable is this way of checking? Describing a ground in detail does not yet show it can be trusted.

What the book’s questions give

We learned to take a claim apart so another person could grasp and check the reasoning. For that we pinned down what exactly is said, which information is given, which conditions are accepted, how the conclusion was reached, and what could change it. When it mattered, we added questions about time.

These questions make no definition of knowledge. They help discuss grounds: find the source document, repeat the calculation, notice a missed condition, or suggest a check whose results could change our minds.

A filled card by itself certifies nothing. It may hold wrong information, an unreliable rule, or a mistaken conclusion. The record’s use is that it is now clearer where to hunt the problem.

No promise comes with it that every mistake will show at once and touch only one line. Sometimes a refinement suffices, sometimes the conclusion must go, and sometimes several tied assumptions need review. Readiness to revise helps in this work but does not replace it.

We aim at a right answer and a clear path to it. That is the task of this book about grounds of knowledge. For it, no need to declare every discussed conviction already accomplished knowledge.

More than can be written down

The word “know” has other uses too. Knowing how to ride a bicycle or tune a dombyra means holding a skill. A description of moves may help learning but by itself does not replace practical knack. And not every master can explain in detail everything he does right.

Knowing a person or knowing a city well is another case. From acquaintance and experience many claims can be drawn, but a short record about a person does not replace knowing him.

Perception and memory joined all our stories too. Someone saw an instrument’s reading, heard a melody, recalled a road. The book turned to these abilities but attempted no full theory of their work and reliability.

Focusing on claims, we picked one side of the conversation about knowledge. The book’s questions may help in discussing skills or personal experience too, but they neither exhaust them nor turn all knowledge into a set of records.

Before the epilogue

Return in mind to the words “I know it”. Behind them may stand more than can be explained at once. And yet one can start with a concrete question: what gives me grounds to think so?

With it we begin taking your prologue phrase apart. Not to replace confidence with doubt, but to understand better what in this answer can be trusted.